journal article Show
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 15, No. 2 (1997) , pp. 553-597 (45 pages) Published By: Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40239489 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
Yearly Plan
Journal Information Founded in 1982, the Yale Law & Policy Review is a semi-annual publication featuring scholarly articles written by law professors and other professionals as well as timely policy proposals and legal analyses composed by judges, elected officials, policymakers, and practitioners. YLPR publishes at least one such Policy Essay per Issue in addition to article-length works, occasional academic Essays, and student Notes and Comments or Book Reviews. Publisher Information The Yale Law & Policy Review is published twice each academic year by students of the Yale Law School. YLPR provides a forum for engaging with various contemporary legal and policy issues. Views expressed in YLPR are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the members. YLPR publishes solicited and unsolicited articles, book reviews, and student-written pieces. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. journal article Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in CongressThe American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 4 (Dec., 1998) , pp. 775-790 (16 pages) Published By: American Political Science Association https://doi.org/10.2307/2586303 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586303 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
Yearly Plan
Abstract In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations. Journal Information The American Political Science Review (APSR) is the longest running publication of the American Political Science Association (APSA). APSR, first published in November 1906 and appearing quarterly, is the preeminent political science journal in the United States and internationally. APSR features research from all fields of political science and contains an extensive book review section of the discipline. In its earlier days, APSR also covered the personal and personnel items of the profession as had its predecessor, the Proceedings of the APSA. Publisher Information Founded in 1903, the American Political Science Association is the major professional society for individuals engaged in the study of politics and government. APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors. While most APSA members are scholars who teach and conduct research in colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad, one-fourth work outside academe in government, research, organizations, consulting firms, the news media, and private enterprise. For more information about the APSA, its publications and programs, please see the APSA website. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Which of the following scenarios best illustrates a way in which an interest group can influence policy making?Which of the following scenarios best illustrates a way in which an interest group can influence policymaking? The United Auto Workers encourage their members to reach out to their representatives to support a jobs bill.
Which is an example of a public interest group quizlet?Public interest groups include Environmental (Sierra Club), Consumer Advocacy (Public Citizen), Civil Rights (NAACP). Public interest groups are also known as citizen groups, and the concerns they address generally have little to do with members' occupational interests.
Which of the following best describes a way that interest groups serve as linkage institutions in the political process quizlet?Which of the following best describes a way that interest groups serve as linkage institutions in the political process? Interest groups educate the public about political policy by providing expert information.
Which of the following principles of government is most related to the author's argument in the passage AP Gov?Which of the following principles of government is most related to the author's argument in the passage? Separation of powers is necessary to our constitutional system to limit the power of the three branches and guarantee limited government.
|
Which of the following statements about interest groups would the author most likely agree with
zusammenhängende Posts
Urheberrechte © © 2024 membukakan Inc.
