Which of the following statements about congressional oversight of the bureaucracy is most accurate

Analyzing the Evidence Exercises

With millions of individuals employed in the executive branch of the federal government, Congress faces an oversight challenge — how to effectively monitor those who are charged with implementing the law. Congressional committees are the primary venue for oversight and they hold hearings at which bureaucrats are questioned and asked to provide information, conduct investigations, and hold much of the responsibility for authorizing the activities and budgets of federal agencies. The figure below presents the number of hearings held in the House and Senate on issues related to government efficiency and bureaucratic oversight from 1946 to 2008.

Which of the following statements about congressional oversight of the bureaucracy is most accurate

1. What is the high point in congressional hearings (how many and in which chamber and year)?
2. What is the low point in congressional hearings (again, indicate the number, chamber, and year)?
3. Which of the two chambers tends to conduct more hearings? Why might this be the case?
As this chapter’s Analyzing the Evidence section describes, there are two ways to think about oversight: police patrols, in which Congress is actively monitoring the executive branch, and fire alarms, in which Congress relies on those affected by federal agencies to alert legislators to problems.
4. Based on the figure above, which type of oversight appears to be the norm in Congress? Be sure to describe why you think the evidence supports your answer.
The discussion in your textbook noted variation in the number of hearings on government efficiency and bureaucratic oversight according to significant events like Watergate, the Vietnam War, and the Republican takeover of the House in 1994. Political scientists have explored the relationship between politics and oversight more broadly. The table below describes annual averages in congressional activity on highly visible investigations of the executive branch under unified and divided government from 1947 to 2006.i
 Unified GovernmentDivided GovernmentPercentage Difference
Number of investigations0.30 0.33 +12%
Days of hearings12.24 19.78 +63%
New York Times articles12.28 19.92 +62%
5. Is there a relationship between partisanship and congressional oversight of the executive branch when it comes to high-profile investigations? If so, what is it?
6. What do you think the number of days spent in hearings and the number of New York Times articles covering these high-profile investigations tell us about oversight? (This question is asking you to think about the nature of the data and what is being measured.)

i Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz, 2008, “Divided Government and Congressional Investigations,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33: 295–321. ↑

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journal article

Overseeing Oversight: New Departures and Old Problems

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1990)

, pp. 5-24 (20 pages)

Published By: Washington University

https://doi.org/10.2307/439999

https://www.jstor.org/stable/439999

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Abstract

In this article, we analyze recent scholarly writing on legislative control of bureaucracy. Once a neglected area of research, this literature has expanded substantially and has become more sophisticated. Still, many basic problems remain unresolved. We find, for example, difficulties in choosing between theoretical elegance and empirical validity. We note problems of choosing between competing conceptions of self-interest as a motivating force. We note also conflict over the relevance of context as it relates to incentives and opportunities. Despite substantial progress in thinking about oversight, we conclude that these basic problems remain unresolved. Especially prominent are gaps in the analysis of the impacts of oversight. We conclude that an institutional focus broader than the legislature is essential to coming to grips with many of these issues.

Journal Information

The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior. The editors encourage contributors to emphasize the cross-national implications of their findings, even if these findings are based on research within a single country. The Legislative Studies Quarterly is the official journal of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association.

Publisher Information

Washington University creates an environment to encourage and support an ethos of wide-ranging exploration. Washington University’s faculty and staff strive to enhance the lives and livelihoods of students, the people of the greater St. Louis community, the country and the world.

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What is oversight of the bureaucracy?

Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs and policy implementation, and it provides the legislative branch with an opportunity to inspect, examine, review and check the executive branch and its agencies.

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