There is a large number of such settlements that provide evidence for the continuing importance of autonomy as a conflict settlement mechanism. This can be demonstrated with reference to self-determination conflicts in North America (Canada), Central and South America (Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador and Nicaragua), Africa (Sudan, Zanzibar), Asia (Iraq, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Philippines), and Europe (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro,[1] Ukraine and United Kingdom).[2] In addition, proposals for autonomy regimes also figure prominently in proposed peace agreements, including in the Annan Plan for Cyprus, the Georgian president’s peace initiative for South Ossetia, and Sri Lanka. Thus in virtually every conflict situation involving self-determination claims by territorially relatively concentrated identity groups at least proposals for autonomy have been made. In many of them, these proposals have been implemented.
A second more specific trend is the combination of autonomy in particular with power sharing at the level of the central government and/or within the autonomous entity. This, however, only tells half the story. It is the specific nature of both of these macro-political conflict resolution techniques—autonomy and power sharing—and the range of ‘supplementary’ mechanisms—be they specific electoral systems, human and minority rights legislation, or coordination and arbitration mechanisms—that need to fit the specificities of the particular case to which they are applied, but also, and importantly, have to fit each other. This means that there are limits to the extent to which the design of complex power sharing settlements can choose at random from the available menu of mechanisms and techniques. This can be illustrated with specific examples and on the basis of broader comparative observations.
Autonomy at Work: The Northern Ireland Settlement
In order to appreciate in full why the Agreement in Northern Ireland reached in 1998 and modified in 2006 provides a reasonable framework for a successful peace and political process, it is necessary to get a more detailed understanding of the conflict as such. The conflict on Northern Ireland is about national belonging. Two communities – Unionist/Loyalist and Nationalist/Republican – have conflicting visions of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland, respectively. Overlapping with this fundamental political divide are further divisions that cut through Northern Irish society: religion (Protestant vs. Catholic), language (Ulster Scots vs. Irish), culture (“British” vs. Gaelic).
Any settlement of the conflict, therefore, required addressing the following sets of issues: relations between the communities in Northern Ireland; the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom; relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and relations between the UK, its constituent entities, and the Republic of Ireland. The Agreements of 1998 and 2006 provide a comprehensive institutional answer to these issues, an answer moreover that was negotiated between the main conflict parties, rather than imposed by well-meaning outsiders.[3]
The provisions of the 1998 Agreement extend to executive and legislative power sharing, and additionally brought to Northern Ireland a wide range of human rights legislation and provisions for victims. The design of the executive power sharing government relies upon the d’Hondt procedure for appointing ministers, thus reflecting party strength in the Assembly as a mechanism to ensure not only proportional representation in the Assembly, but equally in the executive. Under the 1998 Agreement, the First Minister and his (or her) co-equal Deputy were to run on a joint ticket and, to be elected, needed concurrent majorities within both traditions (i.e., 50 percent plus one of members present and voting in both the Nationalist and Unionist communities) and emphasizing individual ministerial and collective Executive accountability. Under the 2006 St. Andrews Agreement, the application of the d’Hondt procedure was extended to cover the offices of First and Deputy First Minister as well. Further changes that affect the Executive include a greater emphasis on the collective nature of government. While the 1998 Agreement had vested strength and independence into individual ministerial portfolios, the St. Andrews Agreement introduces a statutory ministerial Code that requires ministers to ensure that all sections of both traditions in Northern Ireland can participate in the functioning of the devolved power sharing institutions and that there interests are protected. It also opens up the opportunity for Executive decisions to be taken by concurrent majority voting: when no consensus can be achieved in the Executive, a minimum of three ministers can require the employment of this procedure and a decision by the Executive could only be adopted if an overall majority and a majority among ministers from both communities voted in its favor.
The terms of the St Andrews Agreement also establish more clearly than the 1998 Agreement that the Executive is a collective organ of government. In particular, they determine that the Executive be the forum for discussion and decision-making on any issues in the responsibility of more than two ministers, on the prioritization of executive and legislative proposals, and adopting an annual Programme for Government. Crucially, as another illustration of the commitment to power sharing, the ministerial code containing all these provisions can only be adopted and changed on the basis concurrent majorities in the Assembly.
The legislative branch of government in Northern Ireland, the Assembly, is elected by Single Transferable Vote on the basis of six seats being contested in all eighteen general election constituencies in the region. Provisions for legislative power sharing include qualified and concurrent majority voting procedures, committee oversight of ministerial portfolios, and self-designation of elected members of the Assembly.
The most significant amendments to the functioning of the Assembly include a new power of the Assembly to refer individual ministerial decisions back to the Executive for collective consideration. Furthermore, the already existing Committee of the Centre is now on a statutory footing, and thus equal to other departmental scrutiny committees. At the same time, a special standing committee and an efficiency review panel were established to review the working of the institutions and, where necessary, recommend changes to their structures and procedures. Finally, members of the Assembly can no longer change their designation (“Nationalist”/“Unionist”) during an assembly term, except when changing party membership.
Northern Ireland as a whole is a self-governing territory with extensive devolved legislative and executive powers, including in the areas of agriculture and rural development; culture and arts; education, employment and learning; enterprise, trade, and investment; environment; health, social services, and public safety; regional development; and social development. Special arrangements prevail in relation to policing and justice, as well as national security. While the UK government will retain all competences in relation to external defence and significant powers in relation to combating terrorism, there is, under the 2006 St. Andrews Agreement, a provision that makes possible the devolution of powers in the area of policing and justice.
Northern Ireland’s status within the UK is regulated by Act of Parliament (there is no written constitution), and any changes to its status as part of the UK (or the Republic of Ireland, for that matter) is subject to a referendum (“consent principle”).
A North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) allows for policy coordination between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This involves primarily subject ministries, but in Northern Ireland under the terms of the St. Andrews Agreement also gives the Executive collectively a greater role in preparing such meetings, while guaranteeing a right of attendance to the minister into whose competence a particular issue to be discussed at NSMC meetings falls. The two parliaments (and/or their relevant committees) retain rights to scrutinize the work and decisions of the NSMC and its implementation bodies. A Review Group, to be appointed jointly by the Northern Ireland Executive and the Irish Government is to examine the efficiency and value for money of existing NSMC implementation bodies and establish whether there is a case for additional bodies and areas of cooperation within the NSMC. In addition, under the terms of the St. Andrews Agreement, plans exist for the creation of a North-South Parliamentary Forum (bringing together equal numbers from the Irish Parliament and the Assembly, and operating on an inclusive basis) and an Independent Consultative Forum (to represent civil society).
Also established under the 1998 Agreement, is the British-Irish Council (BIC) that brings together the British and Irish governments and relevant executive bodies from all self-governing territories in the UK (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Isle of Man, Channel Islands) to coordinate policy and cooperate on issues of mutual interest. The St. Andrews Agreement mandates the circulation of all papers in preparation for BIC meetings among all members of the Executive and an entitlement for relevant subject ministers to attend. Plans also exist under the St. Andrews Agreement for the creation of a permanent Secretariat of British-Irish Council and an East-West Inter-parliamentary Framework.
Beyond Northern Ireland: A Comparative Perspective on Applications of Autonomy
Recent conflict settlements, such as in Sudan, Iraq, Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, Philippines/Mindanao, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova/Gagauzia, and Ukraine/Crimea establish autonomy regimes that combine forms of horizontal and vertical power sharing and power dividing in an effort to establish stable political and institutional processes conducive to resolving self-determination conflicts. Vertical power sharing and power dividing prove necessary complements of autonomy in two ways: autonomy regimes cannot be established in specific territorial entities without it, and unless such entities become a locus of power, no power can be shared at the sub-state level. Power sharing and power dividing in the Bosnian-Croat Federation, in Bougainville, in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and in South Sudan thus would not be possible if these regions had not been established as legal-political entities and powers had not subsequently been devolved to them.
Mechanisms of power dividing exist in all these cases as well. Apart from the vertical division of power, i.e., the distribution of powers between different vertical layers of authority, one also finds a range of further horizontal mechanisms: most obviously there is an emphasis on independent judicial institutions tasked with the upholding of the constitutional order and the enforcement of human and minority rights legislation. Division of power between executive and legislative branches of government exists as well, but is not as universal. Indeed, parliamentary systems are marginally more common both at central and regional levels of government. Where these systems are integral part of conflict resolution efforts, they are strongly correlated with the establishment of executive power sharing: they are prescribed in Belgium, Brussels, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Tyrol, but emerge voluntarily in Crimea. By the same token, presidential systems, favored by power dividers, do not preclude executive power sharing. Bosnia and Herzegovina (albeit with a semi-presidential system), Sudan and South Sudan serve as illustrations.
From this degree of variation across the case studies one can draw a number of both analytical and empirical conclusions about the continued importance of autonomy as a conflict resolution mechanism. Empirically, there are four important lessons. First, autonomy will only serve its purpose of contributing to conflict resolution if it goes hand in hand with the division of power along a vertical structure of institutions. It can then serve as a useful substitute for formal horizontal power sharing at either national or regional levels, provided that national or regional ethnic demographies create suitably homogeneous territories and that substantial powers are devolved from the centre. Second, no attempt was made in any of the cases mentioned to create heterogeneous entities as subjects of territorial self-governance. Heterogeneity, where it exists, was addressed by means of consociational powersharing within the self-governing territorial entity. Third, coordination between different vertical layers of authority and the establishment of clear hierarchies are important to ensure that vertical layering of authority remains meaningful and can contribute to the long-term sustainability of a particular conflict settlement. Where there is a danger of eroding the degree of autonomy enjoyed by specific territorial entities and their populations created as a particular layer of authority with the specific purpose of conflict resolution (such as Mindanao, South Sudan, and with some qualifications, Crimea), conflict settlements may not be sustainable in the long term.
This means, fourth and finally, that without safeguards against arbitrary government interference, it is unlikely that the conflict parties will develop a sense of satisfactory permanence and predictability in relation to a particular autonomy regime established as a conflict settlement. Legal and constitutional entrenchment, possibly alongside international guarantees, is thus one important mechanism for the stabilization of institutional structures. These and other strategies that provide checks and balances on the exercise of power serve to ensure that principles of liberal democratic state construction shape conflict settlements and enhance their longer-term legitimacy.
However, from the perspective of the minority community another mechanism can be equally important, namely the option to secede in case of major constitutional, demographic or political changes. Thus, Bougainville has a future option for a referendum on its independence from Papua New Guinea. South Sudan is set to have a referendum on independence in January 2011, after an interim period of six years.
These two observations on entrenchment and popular consultation also underscore again that the preservation of democratic procedures is a key factor for stabilizing autonomous institutional structures created for the purpose of resolving self-determination conflicts, because it is through this longevity that institutions acquire their legitimacy. While democratic institutions in themselves are not necessarily and automatically technically viable, compliance with rules and regulations agreed between all conflict parties and their democratic accountability to voters increases the survival chances of smooth and efficient institutional processes. Any form of autonomy combined with power sharing regime will always present a modification of, and constraints to majoritarian forms of democracy, but this does not mean that its institutions can or should be run without popular support. Any autonomy regime does depend upon the willingness and ability of elites to cooperate and make compromises, but also depends on the willingness of the people to support their respective elites in this process and to uphold a settlement negotiated to bring about a non-violent, stable and predictable political process.
[1] The 2003 constitution of the Union of Serbia & Montenegro provided for a bi-national federation between the two entities and included an option for Montenegrin independence after three years if at least 55% of people participating in a referendum would opt for it. The referendum was held on 21 May 2006, and Montenegro declared its independence on 3 June after the country’s referendum commission confirmed as official the preliminary result which had already been recognized by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council on 23 May.
[2] This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of cases. For an analysis of some examples and general trends in the spread of autonomy regimes as part of conflict settlements, see contributions in Weller and Wolff (2005).
[3] The Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations; The Agreement at St. Andrews, //www.nio.gov.uk/Publications/Article/St-Andrews-Agreement